University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Health Care Management Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

5-1988

The Political Economy of Workers' Compensation: Lessons For
Product Liability
Patricia. M. Danzon
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers
Part of the Labor Economics Commons, and the Other Public Health Commons

Recommended Citation
Danzon, P. M. (1988). The Political Economy of Workers' Compensation: Lessons For Product Liability.
The American Economic Review, 78 (2), 305-310. Retrieved from https://repository.upenn.edu/
hcmg_papers/66

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers/66
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

The Political Economy of Workers' Compensation: Lessons For Product Liability
Disciplines
Economics | Labor Economics | Other Public Health

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers/66

The Political Economy of Workers' Compensation:
Lessons For Product Liability
By PATRICIA M. DANZON*
rence is appropriate only if employee moral
hazard is negligible and if compensating wage
demands for job risk provide employers with
optimal incentives for safety. To the extent
deterrence concerns are different in product
liability, and if the single tort award must
serve the dual function of deterrence and
compensation, normative inferences from
WC to product liability are tentative.
Previous analyses of WC have tended to
conclude that WC benefits provide suboptimal compensation. The policy-oriented literature has long argued that WC benefits are
inadequate (for example, The Report of the
National Commission..., 1972). In a recent
study, W. Kip Viscusi and Michael Moore
conclude that

Tort awTards for product-related injuries
have risen rapidly in recent years. This trend
reflects the outcome of court-made decisions,
tempered only recently by modest statutory constraints. The workers' compensation
(WC) system, under which employers are
strictly liable for work-related injuries, is
governed entirely by statute at the state level.
It provides much lower benefits than does
the tort system. There is little presumption
that statutory choices for product liability
reflect a social optimum, since voters in each
state bear a larger share of the costs than the
benefits of limiting consumers' rights against
product manufacturers, many of whom are
located out of state. By contrast, given
the standard assumption that the costs and
benefits of WC are borne by workers
through compensating wage differentials, the
WC system provides evidence on collective
choices for compensation when costs and
benefits of the political choices are internalized within the decision-making jurisdiction.
This paper analyzes the political economy of
the WC system. The purpose is to investigate
whose preferences are reflected in the choice
of the WC benefit structure and what lessons
can be learned for the optimal design of
compensation for product-related injuries
and other injuries currently compensated
through the tort system.
One caveat is in order. The formal analysis of this paper views WC benefits as designed to provide compensation, thereby
ignoring their effect on incentives for care by
employers and employees. Ignoring deter-

the observed rate at which workers are
willing to trade off base wage rates for
higher levels of compensation greatly
exceeds the actuarial rate of trade-off,
even taking into account the administrative costs. These results suggest
that benefit levels in 1976 were suboptimal, provided that one abstracts from
moral hazard considerations.
[1987, p. 260]
Certain features of WC benefits seem inconsistent with basic principles of optimal insurance. Payment is more generous for
routine minor injuries than for permanent
total disabilities. Some states still limit the
duration or the total amount of benefits for
permanent disabilities. For temporary and
permanent total disabilities, the typical wage
replacement rate of two-thirds provides
roughly full replacement of after-tax wages
(ignoring noncash fringe benefits). But the
maximum weekly benefit implies a sharply
declining replacement rate at higher wage
levels. The mean maximum benefit was .43
of the state average weekly wage in 1965; the
mean rose to .81 in 1985, with a range of .36
to 2.32 (see my 1987 paper).

*Associate Professor. Departments of Hiealth Care
Systems and Insurance, Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104. I am grateful to
The Center for Risk and Insurance at the University of
Pennsylvania for financial support; to the National
Council on Compensation Insurance for data: and to
Dong Han Chang for valuable research assistance.
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A finding that WC benefit levels are suboptimal (i.e., below the level that workers
would be willing to pay for) would be
surprising since it would imply failure to
maximize utility of workers and to minimize
costs for employers. However the conclusion
that WC benefits are suboptimal ignores important differences between WC benefits and
the model of the individual demand for compensation that underlies the inference of
suboptimality. First, the WC benefit structure, like any social insurance program, is a
public good for all individuals covered. With
heterogeneity of worker preferences, the
common benefit structure is unlikely to be
simultaneously optimal for all workers. This
raises both the positive question of how the
common benefit structure is determined and
the normative question of the optimal level
of such benefits.
Second, the WC system is only one among
several possible sources of insurance for wage
loss and medical expense. The choice of
state-level public coverages such as WC
should be viewed as simultaneously determined with private health and disability
insurance, taking as given the structure of
federal programs such as SSDI and medicare. The optimal structure of mandated
public programs depends on the functioning
of markets for private insurance. If private
coverages were available at comparable cost
to WC, since private coverages can be
matched more closely to individual preferences, it would be irrational for a state to
incur the deadweight cost of mandating uniform WC benefits. However, if private insurance markets are subject to adverse selection, myopia or free riding, mandatory
coverages may be Pareto improving.
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pected cost of the compensation package is
equal to the potential wage with zero benefits
we, which is also the value of marginal
product under profit maximization. The utility-maximizing level of benefits satisfies
(1)

UO= U1(1 - t)(1 + h),

where t is the worker's marginal tax rate;
h ? 0 is the administrative cost per dollar of
expected benefits (the load on the employer's
insurance); and subscripts 0 and 1 denote
the states of injury and no injury, respectively.' The individual's preferred replacement rate (k = K/W) can be written
(2)

k* = k(We, t, p, h).

Comparative statics analysis indicates that
k * < 0. With state independent utility and
decreasing absolute risk aversion, k e < 0
and k0 < O if taxes are proportional. With
progressive taxes (dt/dWe> 0), k * would
be positive; indeed, if (1 - t)(I + h) < 1, then
k* would exceed unity. But if there is moral
hazard with respect to either the occurrence
of injuries or the duration of claims, this
would impose the additional constraint K <
W (1 ) with progressive tax rates this implies k < 0 and kWe<0.2 However, the
very sharply declining replacement rate implied by the maximum benefit is not predicted. These results may not hold if utility
is state dependent.
II. Collective Choice of Benefits

I. Individual Choice of Benefits

Since the WC benefit structure is a public
good within each state, equation (2) cannot
be estimated for individuals. Given the small
number of states, the assumption of Tiebout
sorting of individuals to achieve homogene-

Consider first the case where insurance is
a pure private good. In each period the
worker faces an exogenous probability of
injury p. If no injury occurs he receives a
wage W; if an injury occurs he receives wage
replacement benefits K. A cost-minimizing
employer would select the cash wage W and
benefits K to maximize the employee's utility, subject to the constraint that the ex-

1This condition for optimal compensation when
wages are taxed is also derived in Viscusi and Moore.
2 For derivations, see my earlier paper. Although
large firms are self-insured or self-rated, perfect experience rating at the firm level may be insufficient to
eliminate moral hazard at the level of the individual
worker. R. J. Butler and J. D. Worrall (1983) conclude
that there is a positive elasticity of claims with respect
to benefit levels.
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ity of preferences within states is not plausible. Following T. E. Borcherding and R. T.
Deacon (1972) and T. Bergstrom and R.
Goodman (1973) the choices of benefit levels
across states can provide information about
individual preferences under certain assumptions, specifically: 1) each voter chooses the
k that maximizes his (or her) utility, given
his "tax price" (s) per unit of K; 2) each
voter's tax price s does not vary with the
level of K; 3) in each state, the quantity
-vFpp1icdjs tiLiciLLVUIatl
qUdnuiiy uemancea,
which is the quantity demanded by the individual of median income (i.e., there is no
vote trading); and 4) income distributions
are proportional, as defined by Bergstrom
and Goodman (p. 286). Given these assumptions, each observation is an observation on
the demand curve of a consumer with median
income given his tax price.
The most difficult variable to measure is
the tax price (s). For publicly provided
services such as education, each voter's tax
share is determined by legislation. But, for
public goods where the publicness lies in the
mandating of a common level of private
purchase, each individual's price depends on
the prices he faces in private markets. In the
short run (with all factors fixed in their
current employments), the supply price per
unit of K to the ith worker in firm j is
simply si. = (1 + hj)pj./(l - pj), assuming
that firms are perfectly experience rated and
each worker pays a fully compensating wage
offset. Let k * denote the preferred replacement rate of the i th worker in firm j, given
s . It is the solution to equation (1) given
the short-run supply price.
But, in the long run, the effective supply
price of K to any worker depends on the
distribution of preferences of other workers,
and on general equilibrium adjustments
to the mandated level of benefits. Assume
that the state arbitrarily mandates a replacement rate k such that for workers of type L,
k > k, and for workers of type H, k < k .
In the long run, type L workers who would
prefer less than the statutory level of benefits
(k > k,*) would not be willing to pay a fully
compensating wage offset if they could get
k, in another state or in the uncovered
sector of the economy. Similarly, any type H
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worker for whom k < k and who can get
kh elsewhere would require additional wage
compensation. Thus mandatory benefits impose a tax on workers for whom k + k*. The
tax for the i th worker is equal to the difference between the cost to the employer and
the worker's valuation of benefits:
(3)

Tij =pj/(1-pj)[(1+hh)
-uolui(i

- ti) ( k - k.* )

assuming within-firm homogeneity. The incidence of the tax depends on general equilibrium adjustments in factor and product
markets. For any worker, the long-run supply
price of K thus depends his share of the
"tax" from mandating nonoptimal benefits
for other workers.
For any k, the effective tax T is more
likely to be positive in small firms, since the
load h is an inverse function of firm size.
The magnitude of the tax also depends on
the cost of supplementary insurance. Let g
denote the load on private insurance. If g < h
(perfect private supplementation), then k <
kh imposes no tax on H. In practice, the per
capita tax from k =tk* is likely to be higher
for k > k* than for k < k*, with some differences by type of benefit. Sick pay and
group long-term disability (LTD) insurance
are very good substitutes for WC wage replacement for high-wage workers (at least in
large firms). Although most lower-wage
workers do not have LTD coverage, SSDI
provides replacement rates at least equal to
the maximum that private insurers would
permit. There is no private coverage comparable to the permanent partial wage loss
benefits provided by WC. Private group
health insurance is a very good substitute for
WC medical benefits for disabilities that
leave the worker employable. But, if disability leads to loss of employment with access
to group benefits, and if the individual does
not qualify for medicare, private nongroup
health insurance markets provide poor protection against the risk of becoming high
risk. Policies are individually underwritten,
preexisting conditions are often surcharged
or excluded from coverage, and loading
charges are typically between .8 and 1 (with
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higher loads for policies that guarantee renewability) compared to loads of roughly .25
or less for WC medical benefits. Thus the
excess cost of suboptimal WC wage replacement is probably negligible. For long-term
medical benefits and permanent partial wage
loss, there is less presumption of asymmetry
in the per capita excess cost from k < k*
and k > k*.
If g < h (perfect private supplementation),
there would be unanimous choice of k = k
unless k, is influenced by myopia or an
intention to free ride. Even if g > h, type H
workers may nevertheless vote for k, if g is
still less than their effective supply price of
WC benefits, including their share of the tax
imposed on type L workers by mandating
k > k,*. Thus the effective price to H of
voting for k > k,* depends on the magnitude
and the incidence of the tax on L, which
depends on elasticities of factor supply,
product demand and factor substitution. In
general, if type L workers are mobile and
type H workers are not, type H workers
may bear part of any excess tax on L.
The incidence of a tax on one type of
labor, where the tax rate differs across states
can be analyzed using Peter Mieskowski's
(1972) general equilibrium analysis of the
incidence of the local property tax on reproducible capital.3 Assume three factors of
production: type L workers for whom k*
<k; type H workers for whom k * > k; and
capital F which includes imperfectly mobile
factors such as land and small entrepreneurs.
All factors are in fixed supply in the aggregate. L is perfectly mobile among states but
H and F are imperfectly mobile. If the tax
on L is uniform across states, the full incidence is on L. But, if the tax rate differs
across states, L in high-tax states will not
bear the cost differential in these states since
wages of L (W,) will be equalized in all
employments. W, falls by the average cost of
benefits, including the average tax due to
nonoptimal benefits. But the incidence of the

3Paul Courant (1977) shows that the Mieskowski
model is only approximately correct, but that suffices to
establish the point being made here.
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deviations from the mean tax (both positive
and negative) is on consumers and other
immobile factors. Forward shifting may be
possible for nontraded goods such as some
retail trade, services, and construction. This
is more likely if small firms, that face a
relatively high tax rate due to higher costs of
providing insurance and safety, do not compete in domestic markets with large firms
that face lower loads for insurance and economies of scale in producing safety. There
may also be backward shifting to imperfectly
mobile factors in high-benefit states and, in
particular, to immobile factors in high-cost
firms in high-benefit states. Of course, if L
in high-cost firms is imperfectly mobile, then
it will bear (part of) the excess tax.
Thus with heterogeneous preferences and
a common benefit structure, the standard
assumption of an individually actuarially fair
compensating wage differential for WC benefits may be incorrect and the choice of WC
benefit levels may be affected. If type H are
less mobile than type L workers, type H face
an increasing marginal cost per unit of K, h',
where h' is positively related to (k - k, to
the elasticity of demand for domestically
produced goods and to complementarities in
production. If h' < g, there would be unanimous choice of k, (ignoring myopia and
free riding). This choice would be optimal in
the sense that it avoids any deadweight loss
from imposing a common level of benefits
on individuals with heterogeneous preferences. With h'> g mandatory benefits impose a deadweight loss and there is no presumption that it will be minimized in the
aggregate with a median voter model of
political choice. However, provided the median voter bears some share of the excess
costs imposed on other workers, he would
vote for a lower k than if k were a pure
private good.
II. Empiricalestimates
Table 1 reports OLS estimates for the log
of the maximum weekly benefit (MAX) for
temporary total and permanent total disability, for approximately 37 states in 1970, 1975,
1980, and 1985. MAX is a public good for
all workers with wages above the threshold

This content downloaded from 165.123.111.89 on Thu, 30 Oct 2014 18:02:35 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

VOL. 78 NO. 2

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY

TABLE 1-MAXIMUM WEEKLYCASH BENEFIT(LOG)

(1970, 1975, 1980, 1985)
Variable
Intercept
Wage (LOG)
Injury Rate
POOR a
SMALLa
UNIONa
MANUFa
AGRICa
MININGa
CONST a
SER VICESa
EDUC > 12
D75
D80
D85
R2

Coefficient

t-Statistic

4.724
0.083
-0.000
-0.022
- 0.047
0.003
0.004

3.52
0.41
-0.04
-3.15
-3.38
0.60
0.76

0.280

0.007
0.026
0.034
0.007
0.083
0.196
0.153
.739

6.38

0.36
--0.96
3.56
1.16
1.30
2.09
1.14

n =146
aMeasured

as percent.

at which MAX is a binding constraint on the
replacement rate, but for lower-wage workers
it should be irrelevant if compensating wage
differentials are individually fair and general
equilibrium effects are irrelevant. The significant negative coefficient of the percent of
low-income families (POOR) is consistent
with the hypothesis that general equilibrium
effects matter. Benefits are negatively related
to the percent of workers in establishments
of 20 or fewer employees (SMALL) which
is consistent with a negative price elasticity
of demand. The significant positive coefficients of percent of workers in agriculture
(A GRIC) and services (SERVICES) could
reflect the higher cost of private supplementation in these industries, as evidenced by
the fact that a disproportionately high percentage of workers in these industries lack
private insurance. Dummy variables for 1975,
1980, and 1985 are positive, although not
highly significant. This suggests either that
the threat of federal intervention following
the National Commission had an effect or
that WC is subject to some of the same
influences that have lead to rising real tort
awards and that these influences are not
captured by the explanatory variables included here. The income elasticity (WAGE)
is insignificantly different from zero. Union-
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ization and other measures of industrial mix
are also insignificant.
IV. Conclusions
This analysis has several implications for
interpreting the choice of WC benefits and
drawing inferences for product liability.
First, no worker votes for less than the benefits he (or she) is willing to pay for, given the
effective supply price, h'. But h' depends not
only on the load on his own employer's
insurance but also of the difference between
his preferences and those of other workers.
General equilibrium adjustments in labor
and product markets internalize to some extent to each worker the excess costs that his
choices impose on other workers. Second,
willingness to pay for state-level mandatory
benefits also depends on the availability of
private supplementary benefits and federally
financed public programs. Thus for some
workers WC benefits may appear to be suboptimal; but this is true only ignoring supplementation and ignoring the deadweight
costs imposed on other workers from mandating higher benefits.
Both factors-supplementation and deadweight costs from imposing common benefits
on heterogeneous individuals-apply equally
in the case of insurance for product-related
injuries. WC benefits therefore provide a reasonable guide for optimal compensation
through the tort system, ignoring deterrence.
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